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Abstract
In this paper we extend our previous work on passive
testing of timed systems to establish a formal criterion to de-
termine correctness of an implementation under test. In our
framework, an invariant expresses the fact that if the imple-
mentation under test performs a given sequence of actions,
then it must exhibit a behavior in a lapse of time reflected
in the invariant. In a previous paper we gave an algorithm
to establish the correctness of an invariant with respect to a
specification. In this paper we continue the work by provid-
ing an algorithm to check the correctness of a log, recorded
form the implementation under test, with respect to an in-
variant. We show the soundness of our method by relating it
to an implementation relation. In addition to the theoretical
framework we have developed a tool, called PASTE, that
facilitates the automation of our passive testing approach.
1 Introduction
The complexity of current systems, the large number of
persons working on them, and the number of different mod-
ules that interact with each other, make it difficult to de-
cide the correctness of these systems. Testing techniques
allow us to provide a grade of confidence in the correct-
ness of a system. Testing techniques can use formal meth-
ods [16, 6, 22, 12] in order to semi-automatically perform
some tasks through the use of tools [26] that help to increase
the confidence on the correctness of the systems under test.
Formal testing originally targeted the functional behavior
of systems, such as determining whether the tested system,
on the one hand, performs certain actions and, on the other
hand, does not perform some unexpected ones. The appli-
cation of formal testing techniques to check the correctness
of a system requires identifying the critical aspects of the
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system, that is, those aspects that will make the difference
between correct and incorrect behaviors. While the rele-
vant aspects of some systems only concern what they do,
in some other systems it is equally relevant how they do
what they do. Thus, during the last decade formal test-
ing techniques also deal with non-functional properties. In
this paper we focus on systems that contain temporal re-
strictions, being already several proposals for timed testing
(e.g. [17, 8, 14, 23, 9, 19, 18, 11]).
In testing, there is usually a distinction between two ap-
proaches: Passive and Active. The main difference between
them is whether a tester can interact with the implementa-
tion under test (IUT). If the tester can interact with the IUT
we are in the active testing paradigm. On the contrary, if the
tester simply monitors the behavior of the IUT, then we are
in the passive testing paradigm. Actually, it is very frequent
that the tester is unable to interact with the IUT, or that the
internal non determinism of the system makes difficult to in-
teract with it. In particular, such interaction can be difficult
in the case of large systems working 24/7 since this inter-
action might produce a wrong behavior of the system. An
example of these systems is the one that we present along
this paper, which we name SSadmin. This system allows
students to check their marks, to change their personal pro-
file and, at the beginning of the academic year, to make the
registration of the subjects to be taken. Testers are not al-
lowed to introduce their own set of tests because this could
damage the database structure. So, they cannot perform ac-
tive testing. Therefore, they use passive testing techniques
by interacting with logs recorded from SSadmin. These
logs contain the historic interaction between the students
and the system. Thus, they can be compared with informa-
tion extracted from the specification to detect faults in the
implementation.
There are several papers on passive testing, but the num-
ber diminishes when we restrict ourselves to formal ap-
proaches. First, we would like to mention the approach
studied in [7]. There, a set of properties, called invari-
ants, are extracted from the specification and checked on
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the traces observed from the implementation to test their
correctness. One of the drawbacks of this work is the lim-
itation on the grammar used to express invariants. A new
formalism that overcomes this restriction for expressing in-
variants was presented in [3, 5]. In particular, it allows to
specify wild-card characters in invariants and to include a
set of outputs as termination of the invariant.
Even though work on passive testing has been carried on
for several years, it can be dated back at least to [4], work
on passive testing of timed systems is very recent [1, 2]. We
propose an extension of the previous work on formal pas-
sive testing so that temporal properties can be also taken
into account. For example, we may be interested in check-
ing whether a system, more properly, the logs observed in a
system, fulfill the following property:
Each time that a user applies a and observes y
the amount of time the system spends to perform
the action y is between 3 and 5 time units; if af-
ter performing some operations the user applied b
then he must observe z before 2 time units and the
performance of all these actions must not exceed
10 time units.
The approach to passively test timed systems presented
in this paper was initiated in [1]. In that paper we gave the
syntax for invariants and an algorithm to check the appro-
priateness of an invariant with respect to a specification. In
this paper we introduce an algorithm to check the correct-
ness of a log extracted from the IUT with respect to a time
invariant. We show that this process is sound in the sense
that the if log does not match a correct, from a certain spec-
ification, invariant then the IUT does not conform to this
specification. Such a formal soundness of passive testing is
ignored in most passive testing approaches. Obviously, our
procedure cannot be complete since passive testing cannot
ensure that a faulty IUT will reveal a fault in the observed
log. We also present our tool PASTE. This tool implements
all the algorithms presented in this framework. We also in-
clude in the core of PASTE an algorithm to classify time
invariants with respect to their power to detect errors.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Sec-
tion 2 we introduce our formal framework to specify timed
systems and in Section 3 the one to describe time invariants.
These sections review previous work reported in [1]. In ad-
dition, we include a new case study to evaluate our approach
and provide an alternative characterization of the notion of
correctness introduced in [1]. Section 4 presents the mate-
rial related to the correctness of the approach: A mismatch
of a log with a correct invariant implies a faulty IUT. In
Section 5 we present some features of our tool PASTE. We
conclude this paper in Section 6 where we give our conclu-
sions and some lines for future work.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we present our formal framework [1].
First, we provide some notation about intervals and time.
Definition 1 We call any value t ∈ IR+ a fixed time value.
For all t ∈ IR+ we have both t <∞ and t+∞ =∞.
We say that pˆ = [p1, p2] is a time interval if p1 ∈ IR+,
p2 ∈ IR+ ∪ {∞}, and p1 ≤ p2. We consider that IR de-
notes the set of time intervals. We consider the following
functions:
• + : IR × IR → IR. If pˆ = [p1, p2] and qˆ = [q1, q2]
are time intervals then pˆ+ qˆ = [p1 + q1, p2 + q2].
•  : IR × IR+ → {true, false}. If pˆ = [p1, p2] is a
time interval and t ∈ IR+ then pˆ t = (t ≤ p2).
uunionsq
In our framework we consider an adaptation of the well
known finite state machines model where we add time to
transitions. The time value associated with each transition
represents the amount of time that this transition needs to
be performed.
Definition 2 A Timed Finite State Machine, in the follow-
ing TFSM, is a tuple M = (S, I,O, T , s0) where S is a
finite set of states, I is the set of input actions, O is the set
of output actions, T ⊆ S × I × O × IR+ × S is the set of
transitions, and s0 ∈ S is the initial state.
We say that M is input-enabled if for all state s ∈ S and
input i ∈ I, there exist s′ ∈ S, o ∈ O, and t ∈ IR+ such that
s
i,o−−→ t s′ ∈ T . We say that M is observable if it does not
have two transitions such as s
i,o−−→ t1 s1 and s
i,o−−→ t2 s2.
uunionsq
A transition belonging to T is a tuple (s, i, o, t, s′) where
s, s′ ∈ S are the initial and final states of the transition, i ∈
I and o ∈ O are the input and output actions, respectively,
and t ∈ IR+ denotes the time that the transition needs to be
completed. Along this paper we will use s
i,o−−→ t s′ as a
shorthand to represent the transition (s, i, o, t, s′).
Regarding the notion of input-enabled, let us comment
the differences with respect to the classical notion. What
we mean by input-enabled is that the machine will be able
to accept any input only when it is willing to accept in-
puts. This means that if a machine is performing a transition
s
i,o−−→ t s′, then during the t time units that the transition
needs to be completed we assume that the machine is not
accepting inputs. Informally, we can consider that the in-
puts received in this lapse can be stored to be processed
once the transition is performed. In order to formalize the
previous intuition, we could use an adaption to our formal-
ism of [15] where a similar concept is used in the context of
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s0s1
s2s3
s4
s5
s6s7
i1, o1, 15
i2, o2, 30
i2, o3, 30
i3, o1, 15
i4, o4, 25
i8, o5, 30
i9, o6, 200
i7, o2, 30
i5, o4, 15
i10, o6, 15
i10, o6, 15
i11, o7, 80
i11, o8, 80
i1= connect
i2= login
i3= disconnection
i4= profile
i5= data
i6= cancel
i7= save
i8= marks
i9= register
i10= data_subject
i11= save_registration
i12= return_option
o1= welcome_screen
o2= option_screen
o3= error_user
o4= profile_screen
o5= marks_screen
o6= register_screen
o7= confirm_screen
o8= no_confirmation_screen
o9= not_spected
Figure 1. Specification of SSadmin using a
TFSM model.
input-output labeled transition systems. Let us note that our
notion of observability allows some degree of nondetermin-
ism. For example we allow transitions such as s
i,o1−−−→ t1 s1
and s
i,o2−−−→ t1 s2, as far as o1 6= o2. In this paper we con-
sider that all defined TFSMs are input-enabled and observ-
able.
Next, we present the specification of SSadmin modeled
by a TFSM. As we mentioned in the introduction such a sys-
tem is used by students to check their marks, their student
information profile and, at the beginning of the academic
year, to register their subjects. The system presented in this
paper is a simplification (in particular, we do not use data
in our formalism) of the one used in our University. In Fig-
ure 1 we give a graphical representation of the specification:
Nodes represent states, s0 being the initial state, and edges
represent transitions, in T0 ⊂ T . For example, the loop
transition from s1 to s1 represents (s1, i2, o3, 30, s1). Let
us note that not all transitions are drawn in the figure since
this would overload the graph. There are two sets of transi-
tions, T1 and T2, that also take part in set of transitions T of
M. Thus, T = T0 ∪ T1 ∪ T2 where
T1 = {(s, i12, o2, 10, s2)|s ∈ {s3, s4, s5, s6, s7}}
T2 =
{
(s, i, o9, 5, s)
∣∣∣∣ 6 ∃s′ ∈ S, o ∈ O, t ∈ IR+ :(s, i, o, t, s′) ∈ T0 ∪ T1
}
The first set of additional transitions, T1, allows the
students, when they are connected, to return to the
option_screen. The second set, T2, ensures that the
specification is input-enabled by adding bogus transitions.
Next, we describe a usual interaction between a stu-
dent and SSadmin. We divide the behavior of the sys-
tem in three different stages. The first one corresponds to
the connection. Initially, the student wants to connect
to the system. She connects to the web page and the sys-
tem shows the welcome_screen. Let us note that the
specification is described from the point of view of the sys-
tem, and this example is presented from a student point of
view because it is more intuitive. Thus, inputs of the stu-
dent are output of the system and viceversa. When the
student sees the welcome_screen she can login into
the system. If an erroneous login is introduced then
the system shows the error_user. If the student in-
troduces a correct login, then the system will show the
option_screen. If the student wants to disconnect, then
she only has to press disconnection and SSadmin re-
turns to the welcome_screen. The time values associ-
ated with these transitions are 15 and 30 time units, respec-
tively. The bigger amount of time denotes that the system is
interacting with the database searching the student login.
In the second stage we include the more used operations
of the students within SSadmin. These are the task of
checking their marks, and the one for accessing and mod-
ifying their personal profile. When a student is connected
with SSadmin, if she introduces profile then the sys-
tem will show profile_screen. In that screen the stu-
dent is able to change some personal information, such as
email and telephone number. Each data that she wants to
change is introduced by the data action and the system
continues showing profile_screen. When the stu-
dent introduces all the data she can both save them or
cancel the operation. Both actions make SSadmin to
show the option_screen. The second operation of this
stage is for checking the marks. The student can see them
by introducing the marks action and the system will show
marks_screen. To return to the option_screen the
student introduces the cancel action. The time values as-
sociated with these transitions reflects if the values are ex-
tracted from the disk, or if the values are in temporal mem-
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ory (for example, when the student is changing her profile
data and the dates are not saved yet).
The last stage corresponds to the register feature. This
feature is available only at the beginning of an academic
course. This is one of the most important and critical
parts of SSadmin. A student who wants to register a
set of subjects has firstly to connect to the system. Af-
ter that, she can introduce register and the system will
show the register_screen. The time associated with
this transition is 200. This amount of time is big be-
cause the system has to search and check all possible sub-
jects where the student can register. Then, the student can
introduce the data_subject into the system in order
to choose the correct subjects. When she wants to fin-
ish she introduces save_registration and the sys-
tem takes 80 time units in order to show if the registra-
tion was correct (confirm_screen) or there was an er-
ror (no_confirmation_screen).
Next we introduce the notion of trace. A trace represents
a sequence of actions that the system may perform from its
origin state. A timed evolution is a simplification of the
representation of the trace, focusing only in the sequence
of input/outputs/times values of the trace. We distinguish
between non-timed evolution and time evolution. All these
notions will be used in the next section to define implemen-
tation relations. As usual, a log is a sequence of actions
representing the historical evolution of a system, that is, a
timed evolution of the system.
Definition 3 LetM = (S, I,O, T , s0) be a TFSM. A trace
of M belongs to S × (I × O × IR+)? × S . We say that
(s, (i1/o1/t1, . . . , in/on/tn), sn) is a trace of M if there
exist s1, . . . , sn such that we have the following transitions:
s
i1,o1−−−→ t1 s1,. . ., sn−1
in,on−−−−−→ tn sn. We denote by
Traces(M) the set of all traces of M .
A non-timed evolution belongs to (I ×O)?. We say that
(i1/o1, . . . , in/on) is a non-timed evolution of M if there
exist s, s′ such that (s, (i1/o1/t1, . . . , in/on/tn), s′) ∈
Traces(M). We denote by NTEvol(M) the set of non-
timed evolutions of M .
A timed evolution belongs to (I × O × IR+)?.
We say that (i1/o1/t1, . . . , in/on/tn) is a timed
evolution of M if there exist s1, . . . , sn such that
(s, (i1/o1/t1, . . . , in/on/tn), s′) ∈ Traces(M). We
denote by TEvol(M) the set of timed evolutions of M .
We define the function total time TT : TEvol→ IR+ as
the sum of all time values appearing in a timed evolution.
Formally, if e = (i1/o1/t1, . . . , in/on/tn) then TT(e) =∑n
j=1 tj .
We define the non-timed equality relation be-
tween timed evolutions, denoted by =nt, as fol-
lows. Let e = (i1/o1/t1, . . . , in/on/tn) and
e′ = (i′1/o
′
1/t
′
1, . . . , i
′
n/o
′
n/t
′
n) belong to TEvol(M).
We write e =nt e′ iff for all 1 ≤ j ≤ n we have that
(ij = i′j ∧ oj = o′j).
A log from M is a finite sequence belonging to
TEvol(M). The set of all logs is denoted by Log. uunionsq
3 Time Invariants
In this section we introduce the notion of time invariant.
Time invariants are used in our approach to represent the
properties that we would like to check against the logs ex-
tracted from the IUT. The notion of time invariant being
correct means that if the time invariant detects a mismatch,
then the implementation that has generated this log is incor-
rect with respect to the specification. Firstly, after generat-
ing a set of time invariants and before checking them against
the log, they must be checked against the specification; oth-
erwise, we might have that an invariant which indicates an
erroneous that might not violate the requirements expressed
in the specification. The algorithm to decide the correctness
of a time invariant with respect to a specification appears
in [1]. Another possibility is to consider that invariants are
correct by definition. In this case we can ignore the spec-
ification since a mismatch will automatically imply that a
fault was detected.
Definition 4 LetM = (S, I,O, T , s0) be a TFSM. We say
that the sequence φ is a time invariant, or simply invariant,
for M if the following two conditions hold:
1. φ is defined according to the following EBNF:
φ ::= a/z/pˆ, φ | ? /pˆ, φ′ | i 7→ O/pˆ B qˆ
φ′ ::= i/z/pˆ, φ | i 7→ O/pˆ B qˆ
In this expression we consider pˆ, qˆ ∈ IR, i ∈ I, a ∈
I ∪ {?}, z ∈ O ∪ {?}, and O ⊆ O.
2. φ is correct with respect to M as defined in [1].
The set of invariants for M is denoted by ΦM , where we
will drop the subindex if it can be deduced from the context.
Let e = (i1/o1/t1, . . . , ir/or/tr) ∈ TEvol(M) and
φ = (ξ1/pˆ1, . . . , ξn/pˆn, if 7→ O/pˆf B qˆf ) ∈ ΦM . We
say that e matches φ if after applying Algorithm 1 we have
that n = j (the loop has visited the first n positions of the
invariant) andm < r (the trace contains at least one element
so that its head can be compared with the last part of the
invariant: if 7→ O/pˆf B qˆf ). uunionsq
We can use the previous definition of matching to give
an alternative characterization of the notion of correctness
introduced [1]. The proof is easy but cumbersome since
both notions are based on the same idea: Traverse the trace
and detect a subsequence that contradicts what is stated by
the invariant.
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Lemma 1 Let M = (S, I,O, T , s0) be a TFSM and φ ∈
ΦM . We have that φ is correct with respect to M ac-
cording to [1] iff for all e = (i1/o1/t1, . . . , ir/or/tr) ∈
TEvol(M) matching φ we have that ie = if implies
oe ∈ O∧te ∈ pˆf∧TT(im′/om′/tm′ , . . . , im/om/tm) ∈ qˆf
where (ie/oe/te) is the m-th element of e, having the vari-
ables m and m′ the values returned by Algorithm 1. uunionsq
Example 1 We consider the specification of SSadmin de-
scribed in Section 2. A simple invariant can denote the
property that after login, an user has to disconnect from the
system. We represent this as the invariant
φ1 = login/option_screen/[20, 40], ?/[0,∞],
disconnection 7→
{welcome_screen}/[10, 20] B [35,∞]
φ1 means that if we see in the log the input login fol-
lowed by option_screen and an amount of time in-
cluded in [20,40], and we observe any sequence of in-
put/output/time without the input disconnection, then
if we observe disconnection we have to see the out-
put welcome_screen in an amount of time belonging to
[10, 20]. In addition, the sum of all time values observed
from the login until the welcome_screen output be-
longs to [35,∞].
Next we define another invariant for the first stage:
φ2 = login 7→
{option_screen,error_user}/[10, 40]
B [10, 40]
In this invariant, the final set of outputs contains two dif-
ferent outputs. Intuitively, this invariant expresses that after
observing any occurrence of login in the log then we have
to observe option_screen or error_user. More-
over, the amount of time associated with this input/output
must belong to the time interval [10, 40].
From the second stage of SSadmin, the following in-
variant, focusing in the profile options, can be considered
φ3 = data/profile_screen/[10, 20],
save 7→
{option_screen}/[20, 40] B [35, 50]
φ3 denotes that after inserting the last change into the
profile_screen, and after saving the current state of
the system, the option_screen and the time associated
with these operations are included in the intervals [10, 20]
and [20, 40] respectively. In addition, the total amount of
time to perform this activity must belong to the interval
[35, 50]. Another invariant for the second stage can focus
on the marks part. The invariant can represent that when the
//Input Data:
//φ = (ξ1/pˆ1, . . . , ξn/pˆn, if 7→ O/pˆf B qˆf )
//e = (i1/o1/t1, . . . , ir/or/tr)
m = 1;
m′ = 1;
j = 1;
while j ≤ n ∧ (m′ + n) < r ∧m < r do
if j == 1 then
m′ = m′ + 1
end
(ie/oe/te) = e[m]//m-th element of e;
if ξj == (i/o) then
if i == ie ∧ o == oe ∧ te ∈ pˆj then
m = m+ 1; j = j + 1;
else
j = 1; m = m′;
end
end
if ξj == (?/o) ∧ te ∈ pˆj then
if o == oe then
m = m+ 1; j = j + 1;
else
j = 1; m = m′;
end
end
if ξj == (i/?) ∧ te ∈ pˆj then
if i == ie then
m = m+ 1; j = j + 1;
else
j = 1; m = m′;
end
end
if ξj == (?/?) ∧ te ∈ pˆj then
m = m+ 1; j = j + 1;
end
if ξj == ? then
m′′ = m; t′′ = 0;
(i′,−) = (ξj+1);
while i′ 6= ie ∧ pˆj  t′′ ∧m′′ ≤ r do
m′′ = m′′ + 1; t′′ = t′′ + te;
(ie/oe/te) = e[m′′];
end
if t′′ ∈ pˆj then
m = m′′; j = j + 1;
else
j = 1; m = m′;
end
end
end
Algorithm 1: Matching e and φ.
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student is in the option_screen, if she inserts the input
interaction marks, then the marks_screen will appear:
φ4 = ?/option_screen/[5, 35],
marks 7→
{marks_screen}/[20, 40] B [30, 70]
uunionsq
4 Correctness of checking invariants against
logs
In this section we first define an implementation relation
to show the correctness of our approach. Next, we present
an algorithm to check the conformance between logs and
invariants. We start by introducing an implementation rela-
tion where time is not considered.
Definition 5 Let S and I be two TFSMs. We say that I
non-timely conforms to S, denoted by I confnt S, if for all
e = (i1/o1, . . . , in−1/on−1, in/on) ∈ NTEvol(S), with
n ≥ 1, we have that
e′ = (i1/o1, . . . , in−1/on−1, in/o′n) ∈ NTEvol(I)
⇓
e′ ∈ NTEvol(S)
uunionsq
The idea underlying the definition of non-timely confor-
mance relation is that the implementation does not invent
anything for those inputs that are specified in the formal
model. Next we introduce our timed implementation rela-
tion. We will define only one implementation relation, but
any of the timed relations introduced in [19] could be easily
incorporated in our framework. The confa relation (con-
forms always) considers that for all timed evolution e of the
implementation, if e is a non-timed evolution of the specifi-
cation S, then e is also a timed evolution of S. With this re-
lation we express that the implementation mimics the timed
behavior of the formal model. Let us remark that since we
are considering observable machines, there is at most one
evolution fulfilling the previous conditions.
Definition 6 Let S and I be two TFSMs. We write Iconfa
S iff I confntS and for all e ∈ NTEvol(I)∩NTEvol(S)
we have that e ∈ TEvol(I) implies e ∈ TEvol(S). uunionsq
Next, we define the correctness of a log observed from a
TFSM with respect to a invariant. Essentially, we will detect
an error if there exists a subsequence of the log that does not
match the invariant. This definition combines the notion of
matching, introduced in Definition 4, and how to deal with
the last part of the invariant, as used in Lemma 1.
Definition 7 Let φ = ξ1/pˆ1, . . . , ξn/pˆn, if 7→ O/pˆf B qˆf
be a time invariant and e be a log from a TFSM. We say that
e is correct with respect to φ, denoted by e ≈a φ, iff either
e does not match φ (see Definition 3) or e matches o and
ie = if implies
oe ∈ O∧te ∈ pˆf∧TT(im′/om′/tm′ , . . . , im/om/tm) ∈ qˆf
where (ie/oe/te) = e[m], having the variables m and m′
the values returned by Algorithm 1. uunionsq
Theorem 1 Let S and I be two TFSMs and φ be a correct
time invariant with respect to S. Let e be a log recorded
from I . If the invariant φ does not match e then I does not
conform to S.
Proof : Let φ = ξ1/pˆ1, . . . , ξn/pˆn, if 7→ O/pˆf B qˆf be a
correct invariant. Let us assume that e ≈a φ does not hold
and we will find a contradiction. First, if e ≈a φ does not
hold then, applying Definition 7, there exists a subsequence
e′ = (i1/o1/t1, . . . , ik/ok/tk) of e such that ik = if and
ok 6∈ O, or tk 6∈ pˆf , or TT(e′) 6∈ qˆf . Let us consider the
three possible cases.
If ok 6∈ O then we have e′ ∈ NTEvol(I) but e′ 6∈
NTEvol(S). Thus, applying Definition 5, we have that
I confnt S does not hold, which automatically implies
I confa S does not hold.
If tk 6∈ pˆn then we have that e′ ∈ TEvol(I) but
e′ 6∈ TEvol(S). Thus, applying Definition 6, we obtain
that I confa S does not hold.
If TT(e′) 6∈ qˆf then we also deduce e′ 6∈ TEvol(S)
because time values of invariants are coherent with those
of the specification. In this case, by applying again Defini-
tion 6, we obtain that I confa S does not hold. uunionsq
We conclude this section by giving an alternative algo-
rithm to establish the conformance between logs and invari-
ants. The problem with Algorithm 1, and its derived notion
introduced in Definition 7, is its inefficiency, since it repeats
a lot of computations when applied to all the subsequences
of a trace due to backtracking when a prefix of the invariant
does not match the current subsequence of the log. Nev-
ertheless, the algorithm is interesting from the theoretical
point of view since it provides a compact and formal cri-
terion to decide whether a trace matches an invariant. It is
straightforward to prove that the new algorithm returns the
same results as the former one.
First, we explain the main features of the new algorithm
that to establish the conformance of a log obtained from the
IUT with respect to an invariant. We present the core of the
algorithm in Figure 2. We also use the auxiliary function
treated presented in Figure 3. The algorithm traverses
all the elements of the log, comparing each of them with
the first component of the invariant. If the current element
of the sequence matches the input/output pair presented in
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input : e = (i1/o1/t1, . . . , ir/or/tr) :: Log,
φ = {ξ1/pˆ1, . . . , ξn/pˆn, if 7→ O/pˆf B qˆf} :: Φ
// where for all 1 ≤ l ≤ n we have that pˆl ∈ IR,
// and either ξk = ik/ok, with ik ∈ I ∪ {?}
// and ok ∈ O ∪ {?}, or ξk = ?;
// if ∈ I, O ⊆ O, and pˆf , qˆf ∈ IR.
output: Bool
Struct A {tt :: IR+; te :: IR; ta :: IR+;
wild :: Bool; φaux :: Φ; }
b :: Stack[A];
baux :: Stack[A];
token :: A;
error ← false; j ← 1;
while (j 6= length(e) ∧ ¬error) do
// we access the j-position of the log
(i/o/t)← e[j];
j ← j + 1;
token.tt ← 0;
token.te ← [0, 0];
token.ta ← 0;
token.wild← false;
token.φaux ← φ;
aux← treated((i / o / t), token, error);
// check if current position holds with
// the first component of the invariant
if (aux 6= null) then
push(baux, aux);
while ¬(isEmpty(b)) do
token← top(b);
aux← treated((i / o / t), token, error);
if (aux 6= null) then
push(baux, aux);
b← baux;
return(¬error);
Figure 2. Correctness of a log with respect to
an invariant.
the invariant, then the algorithm checks if the associated
time value falls in the interval marked in the invariant. If
this holds, then the part of the invariant that has not been
checked and the time registered in the current position of
the sequence are stored in a stack. In this way, we will
have a buffer with all the pending situations that must be
checked when the algorithm reaches the next position of
the log. Thus, for each step of the algorithm we will push a
new element in the stack, if the new position reached in the
sequence fulfills the requirements of the invariant. In addi-
tion, we will check all the pending situations in the stack
against the new element of the log. If it does not hold, then
input : (i / o / t), token::A, &error :: Bool.
output: A.
switch (head(token.φaux)) do
Case : (im / om/ pˆm)
if (i = im) then
if [(token.wild ∧ token.ta ∈
token.te)∨¬ token.wild]∧ o = om ∧ t ∈ pˆm
then
token.tt ← token.tt + t;
token.te ← [0, 0]; token.ta ← 0;
token.wild← false;
token.φaux ← tail(token.φaux);
return(token);
else
return(null);
else
token.ta ← token.ta + t;
if (token.wild ∧ (te  (token.ta))) then
token.tt ← token.tt + t;
token.φaux ← tail(token.φaux);
return(token);
else
return(null);
Case :(if 7→ O/pˆf B qˆf )
if (i = if ) ∧ ((¬token.wild) ∨ (token.wild ∧
(te  (token.ta + t)))) then
token.tt ← token.tt + t;
if ((o ∈ O)∧ (t ∈ pˆf )∧ (token.tt ∈ qˆf )) then
return(null);
else
error ← true; return(null);
else
return(null);
Case :(?m, pˆm)
token.tt ← token.tt + t; token.te ← pˆm;
token.ta ← t; token.wild← true;
token.φaux ← tail(token.φaux);
return(token);
Figure 3. treated correct function.
the element is removed from the stack. On the contrary, if
it holds, then the pending situation is updated with the re-
maining part of the invariant and the time of the element in
the sequence. Let us remark that the fact that the algorithm
finds no match of the recorded log with the invariant when
we are checking the first n elements of the invariant does not
indicate that the sequence does not fulfill the invariant. In
that case, we have not found the preconditions established
by it. It is only when we reach the last component of the
invariant for each of the pending situations, when a verdict
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can be emitted. If we find an error then the algorithm stops;
otherwise, it continues reviewing the rest of the log and the
elements remaining in the stack.
The function treated checks if an element of the se-
quence and a component of the invariant match. In this
function, the treatment is different depending on the kind
of component of the invariant being checked. The first one
corresponds to elements of the form (input/output/time); the
second one deals with the very last part of the invariant. Fi-
nally, the third one manages those elements that contain a ?
symbol. Let us remark that in the second case we are at the
end of the invariant and we have to check all the restrictions
imposed by it. It is the only place of the function where an
error can be found.
Regarding the complexity of our pattern matching strat-
egy, in the worst case we obtain O(r · n + 1) (n + 1 is the
length of the invariant and r is the length of the observed
sequence). Let us remark that even though good algorithms
for pattern matching on strings perform in O(r) (after the
pre-processing phase) we cannot achieve this complexity
because we must check all the occurrences of the pattern
in the log. However, as we commented before, if we con-
sider that the length of the invariant is much smaller than
the length of the log, as it is usually the case, we have that
this complexity is almost linear with respect to the length of
the log.
5 PASTE
In this section we present our PASive TEsting tool, that
we call PASTE. With this tool we show the feasibility of the
formal framework presented in this paper. The kernel of the
tool is described in Figure 4. The data is input in the tool by
using a XML file. This module transforms formatted data
files into the internal data format of the application. From
the XML file, PASTE obtains the specification of the studied
system, represented by a TFSM model, a set of invariants,
and the logs to be checked.
The relationship correct_spec? between invariants
and the specification is used to establish the correctness of
invariants with respect to the specification. It is always
the first relation that is performed in the tool. The rea-
son is that tester can provide any set of invariants and if
she wants to check a log with them, then these invariants
have to be checked against the specification. In addition,
if the specification is missing, then the tool considers that
the provided invariants are correct and skips the correctness
check of these invariants with respect to the specification.
In any case, having a correct set of invariants, we can check
the correctness of the logs with respect to them by calling
the module Correct_logs? If an error is detected then
PASTE notifies it.
In addition to the theoretical framework, PASTE imple-
XML
Invariants
Correct
spec?
Spec
Correct
Logs?
Mutants
Logs
Figure 4. Adaptation of PASTE with mutants
approach.
ments a module with mutation techniques to provide a mea-
sure on how good a set of invariants is. Mutation is a tech-
nique for unit testing software (e.g. [21, 10, 24, 20, 13])
that, although powerful, is computationally expensive. The
principal expense of mutation is that many variants of the
specification, called mutants, must be repeatedly executed.
In PASTE, the specification is mutated and for each mutant
a log is recorded. Mutations are chosen in order to simulate
real faults. The belief is that if we have an invariant that
finds several errors in the logs recorded from mutants, then
this invariant is more likely to find an error in a faulty IUT.
The mutation operators that we use in PASTE are chang-
ing the goal state of a transition, changing the output, and
changing the time value associated with a transition. As
usual, we only consider first order mutants but it is trivial to
generate higher order mutants.
Let us note that we may generate a mutant that is func-
tionally equivalent to the original specification. In order
to establish the effectiveness of invariants, we will discard
equivalent mutants. The notion of equivalence of a mutant
with respect to the specification follows a criterium of trace
inclusion. A mutant is equivalent to the original specifi-
cation if for all possible sequences of inputs that can be
performed by the mutant and the specification the outputs
produced by the mutant are a subset of those considered by
the specification. Intuitively, the mutant should not invent
behaviors when provided with inputs specified in the speci-
fication. This pattern is borrowed from ioco [25].
Once the mutants are generated and checked that are not
equivalent to the specification, PASTE applies the following
loop to generate logs of a certain length from the mutant.
1. We use the variables sδ ∈ S and iδ ∈ I. We start in
the initial state, sδ ← s0.
2. Then we calculate all possible inputs I ′ ⊆ I that can
be applied in that state, that is, I ′ = {i|∃s, s′ ∈ S, o ∈
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O, t ∈ IR+ : (s, i, o, t, s′) ∈ T }. In particular I ′ = I
if we use input-enabled specification.
3. Randomly, we choose an input iδ ∈ I ′.
4. Then, we calculate the set of transitions
T = {(sδ, iδ, o, t, s′)|∃o ∈ O, s′ ∈ S, t ∈
IR+(sδ, iδ, o, t, s′) ∈ T }.
5. Randomly, we choose a transition sδ
iδ,o−−−→ t s′ and
PASTE simulates its performance, that is, it is included
in the log.
6. We change the current state sδ ← s′ and we jump to
step 2 as long as we want to increase the length of the
sequence.
Having a set of traces from the mutants and a set of in-
variants, we say that the invariant φ kills the mutant M if
φ finds an error in a trace generated by M . The goodness
measure of an invariant φ with respect to a set of mutants
M is defined as
E(φ,M) = | Mk || M |
beingMk the set of mutants killed by φ.
Example 2 In Figure 5 we present the results of applying
our mutation technique to the SSadmin system. The in-
variants used in this experiment, φ1, φ2, φ3, and φ4, were
presented in Example 1. Intuitively, the idea is to determine
which invariant kills more mutants. The number of gener-
ated mutants is equal to 2 | S | , being S the set of states of
the specification. In this sample, the percentage of mutants
generated applying the goal state mutant operator is 30%,
the percentage by applying the output state operator is 30%,
and 40% goes to mutants generated after applying the time
mutant operator. From each mutant, we extract five traces
of length n · |S|, with n ∈ {1, 5, 10, 15, 20}. As expected,
the number of killed mutants increases with the length of
the logs. The most effective invariant is φ4, killing around
23% of the mutants when considering the longest logs. uunionsq
6 Conclusions and future work
In this paper we have presented a framework to per-
form passive testing in systems that contain temporal in-
formation. The underlying model to represent systems is
a timed extension of the finite state machines model. We
use time invariants, a timed extension of the notion intro-
duced in [3, 5], to find error on logs extracted from the IUT.
We provide two algorithms (one theoretical and another one
more optimized) to decide whether a log matches an invari-
ant; if a mismatch is found then we can conclude that the
Figure 5. Invariants φ1, φ2, φ3, φ4 comparative
by applying mutation techniques in SSadmin
specification.
IUT is faulty. Finally, we have performed a small experi-
ment on our running specification, the SSadmin system, to
compare four invariants with respect to their power to find
errors. As future work we plan to improve the capabilities
of our framework by adding new classes of invariants.
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